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1962/11/16

# OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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1. Thoroughly agree with your reaction to UN working paper (UNRKL 1795).  
2. As we read proposals, Castro would get internationally verified assurance against invasion in exchange for verified removal and non-reintroduction of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Concept of UN inspection of non-invasion assurance goes well beyond exchange of letters between President and Khrushchev. We believe, as apparently do number of Latin Americans, that Castro would be exacting an unacceptably high price if we were to agree to SIG's proposal. At any rate, do not believe we should encourage SIG to believe that we might fall back to position of discussing internationally verified assurance against invasion of Cuba.

3. It is clear that three different kinds of verification are mixed up in Thant's proposal and clear distinctions should be made between them.

A. Short-term problems: verification of withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba;

B. Longer-range safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons into Cuba; and

C. Longer range safeguards against invasion of Cuba and broader schemes for maintenance of peace in the Caribbean.

/s. Verification

Drafted by: IO:HCleveland/ok 11/16/62

Telegraphic transmittals and classification approved by:

Harlan Cleveland

The Secretary

Classified by: ARA - Mr. Martin (in draft)

L - Mr. Chaves (in draft)

U - Mr. Johnson (in draft)

S/S-S - Mr. Rogers

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4. Verification is required performance under the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, i.e., to make sure that offensive weapons systems have been dismantled and removed from Cuba. There is no question of reciprocity or mutuality here. The Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding had to do with offensive weapons in Cuba, and verification must take place in Cuba alone.

5. When it comes to safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons, the problem is primarily a matter for action inside Cuba. The President's letter to Khrushchev (OCT 27) indicated he understood that an agreement not to reintroduce offensive weapons systems into Cuba would be undertaken with suitable safeguards. With respect to nuclear weapons, this might well be broadened to involve mutuality and reciprocity with other Latin American states (but not the US); indeed, this is just what is envisaged in the Brazilian demolearized some proposal.

6. Cubans and Soviets are evidently raising a new third problem: safeguards to insure that US and other OAS countries abide by whatever non-invasion assurances are to be given. Every attempt to think through just what would be inspected, by whom and where, in such a safeguards system, makes clear that this is a mare's nest, full of undefinable concepts and indeterminate geography.

7. What is wrong with the UN proposal is that it collapses together all three of these proposals (verification of weapons removal; safeguards against reintroduction; safeguards against invasion of Cuba).

8. We do not see the point to U Thant's making proposals to the Cubans that include point six above. We should insist on Cuban acceptance of the quite reasonable proposals SYG has made on one-shot verification (PARA 4, above), and  
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most rapid possible progress toward some system of safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons (PARA 5, above) which is clearly part of Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding.

9. Therefore we should push for proposal of Latin American demuclearised zone. But even here, there is no point in pushing this hard until there is some indication that Cuba will agree to become a part of it. Brazilians have been sounding Cubans out on this; is there any news from that quarter?

10. We are developing here a planning paper showing how a general Caribbean security system might be established, if the attitude of the Cubans mutate in a direction that makes it useful to discuss that subject at all. Essence any such plan would be that UN presence in Cuba is best assurance against invasion of Cuba.

11. Re McCloy suggestion of reference telegram. While it is obviously desirable to tackle before long problem of eliminating Soviet military personnel from Cuba, believe it would be confusing to throw it into current negotiations before we have secured adequate performance from Soviets and Cubans even on the original understanding between Kennedy-Khrushchev.

12. In view hardening stand by Soviets and Cubans, we believe SYG should be reminded that only real alternative to their acceptance reasonable proposals would be necessity for US to deal with the continuing threat in other ways.

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